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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

11 April 1979

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Ass [redacted]
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : PRC Meeting on Rhodesia, 12 April, 3:30 p.m.,
White House Situation Room

1. Action Requested: None; this memorandum is for your information and possible use at the PRC meeting.

2. Background: This meeting is a follow-on to the meeting you attended on 6 April. A new agenda and discussion paper, prepared by State, are attached.

3. You will recall that on 6 April, the PRC agreed to:

- send to the President a draft letter from him to Prime Minister Botha, in an effort to encourage Botha to be forthcoming on the Namibian question;
- report to the President on the disagreement among the agencies over the timing of normalization of relations with Angola, and particularly the questions raised by David Aaron re any quid pro quo, especially a draw-down of Cuban forces;
- present to the President the three alternative proposals re Rhodesian policy, plus any others that might meanwhile be developed.

4. Re Rhodesia, the three proposals were, in essence:

- stand fast with our present policy posture in the Executive Branch, adhering to the principle that we will not support or recognize as legitimate any government that does not meet the test of international acceptance, acknowledging at the same time that the Congress may very well act toward lifting UN sanctions this month and the subsequent formation of a black-led government (Moose);

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-- with an eye mainly toward forestalling or diluting Congressional action, undertake further diplomatic moves which would consist of

- a. an approach to Nyerere; if he disapproved, we would go no further; if he approved, then
- b. an approach to South Africa; and then
- c. an approach to Muzorewa (assuming he is the head of the new regime in Salisbury), asking him again to accept the principle of UN-supervised elections and to begin at once negotiations with the Patriotic Front to determine the modalities of such elections and the procedures for a transitional regime to follow such elections; Smith's departure would be part of the deal;
- d. we would tell Muzorewa that if he accepted these proposals, and the Patriotic Front did not, the US Executive Branch would not oppose the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia; if, on the other hand, the Patriotic Front also accepted these proposals, our sanctions policy would not change pending the outcome of the negotiations (Lake);

-- attempt through various channels and by various means to encourage Mugabe to split from the Patriotic Front and enter an alliance with Muzorewa, thereby forming a Shona base (consisting of 75% of the African population) for a black-led government, and leaving Nkomo to wither on the Soviet/Cuban vine (Roberts, DOD).

5. The latest agenda makes no mention of Roberts' proposal. The Discussion Paper includes only the "Lake" proposal and what appears to be a more detailed and somewhat more "active" version of "Moose".

6. The potential intelligence contributions to this meeting would appear to be consist primarily of assessments of relationships among the leading players. NFAC views on these questions have been attached, as well as an appreciation of Mrs. Thatcher's attitudes and likely policy re Rhodesia. We have also included some fact-book type materials on Rhodesia, Namibia and Angola.

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NFAC #1600-79

DDCI MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

29 March 1979

DDCI MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation, 28 March 1979

Keen interest was shown in the briefing on Rhodesia. The observation was made that Muzorewa was not reputed to be a politician but he seemed to be doing quite well. He was a sensible man. It was noted that Muzorewa would prefer to deal with Mugabe while the whites would prefer Nkomo. I said that was correct.

I struck a particular reaction when I indicated that the South African attitude was hardening and that the possibility of Thatcher coming into power was giving heart to the Rhodesian whites.

When I noted later in the briefing that the Congress could preempt our options, the comment was made that the British might preempt them before the Congress did. He had not focused on the importance of the UK internal situation, but it clearly had a bearing. One possibility would be to cut a deal with the South Africans where they support us on Namibia and we would agree to recognize the internal settlement. Brzezinski was directed to organize an immediate PRC meeting on Rhodesia.

/s/

Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Rhodesia - Congressional Actions

- the Case-Javits-Moynihan Amendment (to the State foreign aid authorization bill), which calls on the Executive Branch to determine if the elections to be carried out by the Smith regime are fair and just, if all parties and population groups are given an opportunity to participate, and if the fairness of the elections is attested to by internationally recognized observers. Case-Javits further requires the President to cease U.S. observance of UN Security Council sanctions regarding Rhodesia if he determines that the conditions of the Amendment have been met. (The other consideration in the Amendment was a determination that Rhodesia had committed itself to negotiate in "good faith" with the Patriotic Front and other parties; this question is not at issue at the moment, although it could well come up again later despite Smith's "acceptance" of US-UK proposals for a meeting.)
- the McGovern-Hayakawa Resolution (passed by the Senate, but not yet -- if ever -- by the House), which calls for the selection by the president pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of two "co-chairpersons" who in turn are to select 25 to 50 private individuals to serve on a team to observe the Rhodesian elections and to report thereon to the Congress. This resolution is in the context of providing "assistance" to the President in reaching the determination required by Case-Javits.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

PRC on Rhodesia
12 April
DCI's Book

DCI / DCI : NIU/AF
attached

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Date

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